Before the war, Fighter Command decided their main task was to defend England from attack by bombers. It was also believed that these bombers would have to fly from bases in Germany, and would thus be without fighter escort. Having created the ideal scenario to tackle, the RAF then created the ideal tactics to counter it. These were called "Fighting Area Tactics" which would have been perfect during the First World War, which itself may be explained by the fact that the senior officers who formulated them were ex-RFC flyers. Their thinking was based on their own experiences of almost a quarter century before, rather than the current reality where aircraft speed had increased two-fold and armament had increased four-fold! By contrast, German tactics were developed by front-line flyers such as Galland and Moelders in the Spanish Civil War. So far ahead were they in their thinking, that their basic formations and tactics are still used today, over sixty years later.
Fortunately, one aspect craved by the powers-that-were in the RAF was rigid control over their pilots; discipline and tight formations was everything, they thought. With radio came the potential to control whole squadrons from the ground, but without any means of assessing the tactical situation in the air, such control was unusable. RDF was greeted with enthusiasm because it enabled this control to be used, and generally to good effect. Even so, after the Battle at least one squadron commander reacted to this by stating the ground controller should not direct airborne squadrons to the intercept, but merely advise of the overall sittuation and allow the commander in the air to make the decisions! Which was easy for him to say, given the pilot in question was not part of 11 Group which bore the brunt of the Battle, and whose own performance as a leader has been called into question by some historians.
Unfortunately, radio also allowed the squadron leader to rigidly control his own squadron in the air. In WWI, close formation flying was required for communication by hand-signals, but once battle was joined it was every man for himself. In the RAF, radio meant even tighter formations could be flown by ordering stragglers to close up, or to direct formations to perform pre-planned manoeuvers. In the Luftwaffe it meant the opposite, formations being opened out as the radio replaced the hand as a communication medium, and tactical flexibility replacing rigidity. It was a hard lesson for the RAF to learn, and the Luftwaffe was a brutal teacher.
The next level below the group was the Sector. Each Group was split into a number of smaller areas, each containing two or three airfields. The Sector Controller would receive orders to intercept particular formations with a particular number of squadrons and would then issue intercept orders to the squadrons of his choice.
German radio intelligence would pick up these transmissions, but was unaware of RDF's guiding hand behind them. As a result they thought the British pilots lacked training and needed constant instructions from an ordinary ground controller, a very inefficient system! With each squadron tied closely to a single point, it would be easy to punch through these single squadrons, or to fly through the gaps between them, or so they thought. The flexibility of the RAF came as a considerable surprise to the Luftwaffe. What is even more surprising is that when they had to devise their own defence network, this is exactly what they did, particularly with their night-fighters - and they were proved correct, such a defence was ineffective.
The codes used were:
Scramble: Take off
Saunter: Minimum cruising speed
Liner: Economical cruising speed
Buster: Maximum cruising speed
Gate: Absolute Maximum speed (limited to 5 mins)
Vector X-Y-Z: Course to steer, always stated as separate digits (eg Vector one-two-three, not one hundred and twenty-three).
Angels A: Height in thousands of feet. Always stated as a single number (eg Angels twenty, not Angels two-zero). Sometimes a secret addition of up to 5,000 feet was made to throw off German eavesdroppers
Orbit: circle a given point
Pancake: land to re-arm and refuel
Bogey: Unidentified a/c (ie not necessarily enemy!)
Bandit: Enemy a/c
Tally-Ho!: Either "am attacking" or "enemy sighted"
Messages were (supposedly) always sent in a particular order, so if part of the message was missed, the rest could still be understood, although in practice this was often shortened and detail such as enemy strength, speed, and make-up if known included:
Course, Height, Direction to Enemy (in clock code), How far, How high.
Messages were finished "Listening out" or "out" if no reply was required, otherwise "over to you" or "over". "Over and out" was _never_ used (as it's a contradiction!), nor were "roger" or "wilco" during the Battle as these were US terms and not adopted by the RAF until 1943.
Squadrons and sectors had individual callsigns, which were changed periodically for security. Each pilot within the squadron had a two-digit individual number as well, starting with one-four for the squadron commander, but usually pilots identified themselves by their formation code (Red 1, Yellow 3, etc).
A complete message from a controller to a squadron might go like:
"Mustafa Red 1, this is Coley. Vector one-eight-zero, angels twenty, bandits 12 o'clock, ten miles, bandit's angels fifteen. Over."
However, there was an added complication with RAF radio transmissions. The RAF during the Battle had only HF sets (although it was in the process of switching to VHF sets). Apart from poor receiving qualities and a woefully short range, these had only two channels. One was a pre-set frequency, meaning transmissions between squadrons were impossible, since each had a different frequency. The other was for "High Frequency Direction Finding", known officially by the code-name "Cockerel", or unofficially as "Huff-Duff" from its initials, or "Pipsqueak" from the noise it generated. Every aircraft's radio was set to automatically transmit a 1,000-cycle note for 14 seconds each minute. Sources vary on the exact application of the timing; some say that different a/c in the same squadron transmitted for different 1/4-minutes, producing a constant note from the squadron. Others say that different squadrons were assigned different quadrants, allowing each of four squadrons to be located by this method, identified by the timing of their "squeak". Any more than four squadrons in the air required the extras to report their position verbally. Either way, each sector had three detection stations, and by taking a triangulation fix on this signal from their sector's a/c (a/c in other sectors generally being out of transmission range), the position of friendly aircraft could be accurately plotted by the controllers. Unfortunately for the pilots, their voice channel would not work during the 14 second transmission, although it could be switched off or over-ridden by the pilot when necessary.
Another point sometimes forgotten when examining the difficulty of making an interception is all RDF stations were on the coast, looking outwards. Once across the coast, their was no RDF tracking. Instead, volunteers in the Observer Corps tracked incoming raids, although if there was cloud they could only do so by sound in many cases. Post-war analysis found their reports to be quite accurate even by sound alone, but at the time there were no guarantees.
Prior to the war, the establishment of each Sqn was 12 aircraft (a/c). At some stage around the outbreak of war, Fighter Command wanted to expand the number of Sqns, but there were not enough planes available to do so and maintain a reserve of a/c, although at that stage they had plenty of pilots due to the call up of all the various reservists. As a compromise, each Sqn was instead increased to 16 a/c, with the extra a/c available for the excess pilots to fly, or to replace u/s machines to keep the existing Squadrons at full flying strength. During the Battle, at the start of August, pilot establishment was also increased by Dowding, although this was done simply to create a deficiency on paper in order to give an excuse to accelerate pilot training. This proved to be wise, as once the Battle increased tempo after Eagle Day losses of pilots began to outstrip replacements, something Dowding had foreseen but which he cold not state without sounding pessimistic.
Even with this increase in aircraft, fighter tactics were still worked around the basic 12 a/c formation. A Squadron consisted of two Flights of 6, each divided into two sections of 3. "A" Flight consisted of Red (No 1) and Yellow (No 2) sections, "B" Flight of Blue (3) and Green (4), although the a/c themselves were not color-coded! If extra sections flew, which was a rare event, they were White (in A flight) and Black (B). Standard formation for each section was the "Vic". This formation was first adopted in WWI so the wingmen could see the hand-signals of their leader. The RAF kept it throughout the 1930's, even after the advent of radio, and then developed tactics around it which also belonged to WWI! By contrast the Germans abandoned the Vic as soon as they had radio-equipped aircraft during the Spanish Civil War. Other formations were line abreast, line astern, and echelon. Complete formation descriptions could be given by the relationship of flights, sections and individual aircraft. The leader in the section was designated "No 1" (eg "Red 1"), his right wingman in Vic "No 2" and left wingman "No 3".
One standard "search and cruise" formation was Flights Echelon Right, "A" Flight Sections Echelon Left, "B" Flight Sections Echelon Right, a/c in Vic. I will now attempt some ASCII art to illustrate:
T From L to R:
T T Yellow (A Flight), Red (A), Blue (B), Green (B).
T T An alternative was for both flights to echelon
T T T T the same way in order Red, Yellow, Blue, Green
T (Flights Echelon Right, Sections Echelon
T T Right, a/c in Vic)Other Section formations were:
T Line T T T T Echelon T T Astern T Left- T T Line Abreast T -Right T
No 1: One section v lone bomber. On sighting the enemy, the section leader orders the section into Line Astern, and flies into the bomber's blind spot (2,400" behind, 100-200" below). Closing slowly (between 20 and 40 mph overtake), the leader opened fire and continued until his ammo was exhausted. Breaking off, No 2 and 3 repeated the attack in sequence, reforming into Vic after all had broken off. If cloud or a low-flying enemy were encountered, the attack was made either slighly above or slightly to one side instead.
No 2: One section v lone bomber. On sighting the enemy, the section leader orders the section into Line Astern, closing in astern and 2,000" below the bomber. The leader pulls up into a steep, near-vertical climb, reduces to a shallow climb when in range and fires at an initial deflection angle of 40 degrees, breaking off down and to one side just before reaching the bomber's altitude. At this point no 2 starts its attack, and so on. This attack required excellent deflection shooting!
No 3: One Flight v three bombers in Vic. If behind, Leader orders Sections Astern (the sections remain in Vic, but move from echelon into line astern). Closes to 2,400" behind and slightly below. All a/c in Red section open fire on opposite number in enemy formation when ordered by Red 1. Once ammo exhausted, break off and Yellow section repeats.
If ahead or to one side, Leader orders Sections Astern, then Line Astern (a/c within sections also form into line, making a string of 6 a/c), then turns into initial attack position, then sections reform into Vics (but the Flight remains Line Astern), and so on from there.
Again, if underlying cloud or enemy low-flying didn't allow attack from underneath, then the attack was made from slightly above.
No 4: One flight v three bombers in Vic: A cross between 2 and 3. If not behind, then the Flight forms into Sections Astern, then a/c Line Astern and turns (exactly as per No 3), reforming into Sections Astern, a/c in Vic; once behind (or if already behind) the target, Leader closes as for a No 2 attack, with the target for each a/c being his opposite number. Red Section then climbs to attack, all firing simultaneously on Red Leader's order. When Red Leader orders his section to break, Yellow Section begin their attack. The break was to be made by throttling back and diving gently to one side. It was possible for the lead section to repeat their attack if necessary (avoiding the diving Yellow section!) and so on. Reformation after breaking away completely was to be into Flight Astern, Sections in Vic.
No 5: One flight v bombers in a large Vic: Assume the bombers are 9 a/c in Vic. The last three a/c to the left or right (I will use the right) are singled out as targets. Initial maneuvering into position was the same as for the No 4 attack, except formating to the rear and only slightly below the enemy at the point where the Flight was Sections Astern, Sections in Vic. The Leader at this point would be directly behind the a/c second from the end of the enemy Vic, and here it gets complicated. As the Leader made all the decisions, and his section merely mimicked him, he had to be in the lead, and his section must also match the formation being attacked in order for all three to be in range at once - in this case, the rear three a/c being targetted are effectively in Echelon Right. So the order is given "Echelon Starboard GO!", which involves a lot of crossing-over and throttle-juggling, especially for the No 3.
The No 1 shifted over in front of the No 3. No 2 stayed in the same relative position, moving over to just behind where the No1 had been. The No 3, however, had to slow down to be behind the No 2 and move all the way across to be behind the No 2's starboard wing, then accelarate again to keep station.
The formation would then close to firing range and open fire on the Leader's order, break away on his order, and then the second section would fire. After attacking and breaking away, the Flight would reverse the switching back to Sections Line Astern, a/c in Vic.
No 6: Squadron v Squadron of bombers in Vics: an absolute nightmare. To turn to get behind their targets, the whole squadron forms into Sections Astern, then Sections into Line Astern, then turns, then reforms into Sections Astern, in Vic; if already behind, then they just went straight to Sections Astern, lining up behind the right-most Vic. Then the order to deploy would be given, and Yellow and Green sections would swing out to be behind the left-hand Vic, and accelerate to be alongside their lead Sections, forming Flights Astern, Sections Abreast, a/c in Vic. The attack then flows as per attack No 3.
This attack actually allows some variation! It is assumed A Flight scores some successes, and so B Flight must adjust their attacks accordingly. B Flight leader - Blue 1, in the right-hand section - is to take the right-most surviving aircraft as his target. His No 2, who is in Vic is to his right, takes as his target the aircraft second from the right, meaning he has to fly across behind his leader to line up on his target. Blue 3, already to his left, moves over and takes the next aircraft along. Yellow 1 takes the next, meaning Yellow 2, who was between Blue 3 and Yellow 1, must cross over and push aside Yellow 3....
If and when this attack was over, the squadron reformed into Sections Astern, a/c in Vic.
The only other possible variation to any of these attacks was if the enemy formation was other than given; so if a Flight encounted a bomber Section that was in Echelon Right, they would use No 3 attack but in Echelon Right rather than Vic. These maneuvers were not automatic, the Flight Leader at each stage gave instructions, followed by "GO!" As an example, the instructions for a No 3 attack started from abeam/in front of the enemy in Vic were:
"Sections astern GO!" [flight forms sections astern]
"Line Astern GO!" [sections form a/c line astern]
"No 3 Attack Turning Port/Starboard" (an info-only message, not followed by "GO!" as normal flying was follow-the leader anyway) [turn behind enemy]
"Sections form Vic GO!" [sections return to a/c in Vic]
"No 1 Section fire GO!" [everyone opens fire]
"No 1 Section break away GO!" [everyone stops firing and turns to same side as attack entered from, maintainng the Vic as they do so]
It occured to the RAF that if FC were being "successful" in shooting down unescorted bombers during exercises, then it could be assumed the Luftwaffe would be too, once the real war began. And since attacking Germany would pose the same range restrictions on any FC escorts, the long-range escort fighter (the Blenheim 1F) was developed for Bomber Command. The fact this aircraft type was then assigned to Fighter Command failed to jog anyone's thinking there that the Germans could develop an aircraft to fulfil the same role. RAF thinking appeared to be that they would escort their bombers, but their enemy would not!
The fact that the Germans then actually developed their own longe-range fighter, the Bf110, did not alter FC's thinking that their only opponents would be unescorted bombers. It was even FC's official view at one time that the high speeds then being attained by then-prototype fighters of over 300 mph made fighter-to-fighter combat impossible! A ballistics officer then worked out that if armament was increased from two to eight guns the rate of fire was enough to engage a fighter at these speeds. A suitably reliable gun was found, modified, and installed in the wings of these new fighters to allow them to shoot down other fighters. Even so, still no thought was given to developing dogfight tactics, the bomber was the only enemy their fighters would encounter. And development of 20mm aircraft guns, far more effective against bombers than rifle-calibre machine guns, proceeded at a snail's pace.
It turned out that Bomber Command was right, fighters were vulnerable to mass defensive gunfire when attacking in ones or threes, FC-style. Their gentle turns away, presenting a plan view and exposing their vital radiators at close range to gunners with nothing else to shoot at, were just asking for trouble. The under-gunned German bombers managed to down their share of British fighters during the Battle of Britain, while many bombers escaped from the over-gunned British fighters with no more than extra ventilation from bullet holes where 20mm shells would have been more effective. The Bf109s, with half the guns of their fighter opponents, proved the fallacy of the RAFs weaponry, even though their 20mm cannon were low-powered. Sadly for the RAF, it also turned out that the British bombers were inadequately armed when attacked by multiple a/c at once, Luftwaffe-style. And it also turned out the only true defence against a single-seat fighter was another single-seat fighter (with the possible exception of the Mosquito), so perhaps on that count FC was right to ignore the threat of the Bf110.
Other problems with the "Fighting Area Tactics" arose from their obsession with close formation flying - the Vic had only 50-100 yards between aircraft, sometimes less, and sections were a similar distance apart from each other. Yet the wingmen were supposed to be able to maintain position on their leader, avoiding a collision, and line up their sights on their target at the same time! Needless to repeat the fact that keeping watch for enemy fighters was an impossibility in this formation. But Fighting Area Tactics assumed no escorting enemy fighters, and were not altered even when this assumption was clearly invalidated by the presence of Bf109s in Calais.
RAF thinking changed slowly. Some squadrons in France copied the Armee de l'Air formation of five a/c sections - three a/c in a widely-spaced Vic, with two a/c behind and at different heights, weaving back and forth in opposite directions and watching out behind. A variation was kept by these (and adopted by others) during the Battle, detaching one or both of the no 6 a/c from each flight (Yellow 3 and Green 3), or both wingmen from Yellow section, above and behind the formation as a "weaver". These were known as "Arse-end Charlies" and their casualty rates were high due to their exposed position, especially when they failed in their assigned task. Later, whole sections were used as weavers instead of single a/c. In the main, squadrons who served in France did not use Fighting Area Tactics during the Battle of Britain, realising their futility (often from bitter experience) and instead breaking up into individual combats on contact with the enemy, although this made them prone to being bounced within the dogfight as they had no wingman at all to warn them.
Some squadrons at least spread their sections wide apart, or loosened their Vics to give them more flexibility. [An example is the common picture of 610 Squadron on patrol, with a/c DW-O and DW-K prominent in the foreground (and the third of the very close Vic obscured behind DW-O). In the full picture, two other sections are visible, well spaced from each other, with a/c either in echelon or line astern, and also flying at slightly different heights.] While still not a match for German tactics, these variations were a major improvement and at least allowed a proper look-out to be kept by all pilots, not just the formation leader (since subordinate leaders also had to formate on him, they could not keep a 100 percent lookout either).
Another major variation was 111 Squadron's attack method. The squadron would form into line abreast and attack a bomber formation head on, with all 12 a/c firing on the leader's signal. The bombers would react by breaking wildly to avoid both the mass of firing and possible collisions, and 111 would then take advantage of the loss of cohesion to pick off individual bombers. [The first time it was tried on 10 July, a collison did occur, but this was during the general melee which followed. The stricken Hurricane was photographed by a bomber crewman, the missing wing and the baling-out pilot visible in the picture. The pilot, F/O TP Higgs, sadly did not survive the bale-out, his body washing ashore in Holland a month later].
Fighting Area Tactics were official policy throughout the Battle, and squadrons were required to practice them (even if most had already sensibly abandoned them!) until Spring 1941, when more realistic tactics were finally adopted.
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