Battle of Britain

"To the thousands of airmen from all sides who so desperately and gallantly fought each other in the tumultuous skies of World War Two. May they be remembered for the courage it took to fly mission after mission, often in the face of terrible danger, to fight for the causes they believed in. Their exploits inspired generations of today's aviators, myself included."

Fighting Wings Dedication
J D Webster

8 August, 1940...

During the opening phase of the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe conducted what they called Kanalkampf - attacks on shipping in the English Channel. The forces committed by the Germans were nowhere near their full potential, as they were still building up to full strength after the wear, tear and attrition of the Battle of France. Only when their bases were fully prepared and their units back up to strength would the assault on England itself begin. For their part, Fighter Command refused to be drawn into what would have been a battle of attrition over the Channel, and likewise husbanded their available forces for the inevitable onslaught that was to come. The Admiralty were made fully aware that their convoys could not expect anything but token protection from Fighter Command, but still they continued to demand more and more cover from the RAF.

Attacks on Dover harbour, and the sinking of two destroyers based there, had forced the Navy to rebase their remaining ships from Dover to Portsmouth before the end of July, and to temporarily halt convoy traffic. However, the Admiralty decided the convoys of colliers must continue - to stop them would be admitting they had lost control of the Channel. A group of merchant captains gathered for a briefing on 7 August were told this bluntly. German radio was claiming the Luftwaffe had closed the Channel to British shipping, and the Admiralty intended to prove this false. "We don't give a damn for your coal, we'd send you through empty if we had to," the merchantmen were told. "It's a matter of prestige."

And so, on the evening of 7 August, a convoy of twenty merchant ships and nine escorts, codenamed CW9 by the Navy but known as "Peewit" to the RAF, left the Thames. It was planned that this convoy would pass through the Dover Straits in darkness, and at first light it would pick up its fighter escort off the south coast.

Unfortunately, the British were as ignorant of German radar as the Germans were of theirs. The Freya radar set at Wissant, which unlike its British counter-parts was used for detecting shipping rather than aircraft, picked up the convoy in plenty of time. In the pre-dawn darkness, a flotilla of E-boats attacked the convoy's ships, sinking two and damaging another. In the confusion two other ships collided, sinking one, and as dawn broke the convoy was no longer an orderly group but was scattered over several miles.

The Battle is joined.

However, the convoy's scattering worked in its favour, as it made it difficult for the Luftwaffe to locate them all in order to plan their attacks. Another factor that prevented a complete disaster was the German command structure. They were confused as to whether the ships were in Luftflotte 2 or 3's area of responsibility, and so both Luftlottes initially did nothing, giving the ships several hours grace to collect themselves into some sort of order before the Stukas of Fleigerkorps VIII, part of Luftflotte 3, launched their first attack at 9 o'clock, escorted by Bf109s of JG27. The cloudbase that morning was only 2,000 feet, and the convoy was especially equipped with barrage balloons in an attempt to discourage attempts at dive-bombing. This, combined with determined fighter attacks from five squadrons from 11 Group and one from 10 Group, prevented the Stukas from getting clear bombing runs, and this attack was ineffective. There were no losses on either side.

Meanwhile, fighter sweeps over south-eastern England by elements from JGs 3, 26, 51, 53 and 54 had drawn some attention, being met by Spitfires from 41, 64, 64 and 610 Squadrons. Four Spitfires were lost (with three of their pilots killed), one force-landed and two others badly damaged. Luftwaffe losses were one shot down, four crash-landed in France, and one badly damaged.

The second attack on "Peewit" occurred around midday as the convoy was east of the Isle of Wight. A force of 57 Stukas, again escorted by about 30 Bf109s from JG27, and a further 20 Bf110s of LG 1, were intercepted by a mixture of 30 Spitfires and Hurricanes from 145, 257, and 609 Squadrons, later joined by more Hurricanes of 238 Squadron. The Stukas still managed to get through, sinking four ships and damaging seven others.

Determined to sink the entire convoy, Fleigerkorps VIII returned in force at about 5 pm, mustering eighty-two Ju87s in another attack to the south of the Isle of Wight, escorted by 68 Bf109s and Bf110s. 10 and 11 Groups responded with seven squadrons. Amongst these was 145 Squadron, returning for its third battle over the convoy for the day. Between them, 145 and 43 Squadrons accounted for most enemy losses on the day. Unfortunately, even their effort was not enough. Six damaged ships limped into the nearest port; only four of the original convoy arrived at their intended destination of Swanage, Dorset.

The Tally

The British claimed to have destroyed sixty aircraft - twenty-four bombers and thirty-six fighters - while the Luftwaffe claimed forty-nine. Both sides regarded the day as a victory, but it is arguable if either won the day.

Fighter Command had actually lost only nineteen planes on the day - and sixteen of their valuable and irreplacable experienced pilots killed or missing, plus still others wounded - and most of these losses (13 Hurricanes and a Spitfire) were protecting a strategically worthless convoy. The exact losses were:

Of the planes and pilots lost, five of each were from 145 Squadron, making them the hardest hit of the day. Against these losses, the actual German losses inflicted by 145 were also highest at ten destroyed aircraft, although at the time they claimed 21! The total actual losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe vary from source to source, thirty-one being the most common figure, made up of:

[The Luftwaffe loss figure appears to be made up of shot down, crash-landed and beyond-repair figures added together, whereas the RAF appear to have had an amazing ability to restore damaged aircraft to flying condition, thanks to Lord Beaverbrook and his Civilian Repair Organisation, so their force-landed aircraft apparently flew again. At least, that's the way most histories appear to record the situation.]

Examining the record of types lost, eighteen front-line RAF fighters does not seem to be a fair exchange for the fifteen Stukas, since shooting these down to protect the convoy was the object of the interception. Taking a longer, strategic view, neither is an exchange of eighteen single-engine fighters for thirteen equivalent Luftwaffe types, given the latter started the Battle with a 2:1 numerical superiority.

On the plus side for Fighter Command, nine of the ten fighters downed had fallen to Hurricanes, whose continued good performance after their efforts in France was heartening, considering that of the 19 day-fighter squadrons of 11 Group on 8 August, 13 were equipped with Hurricanes and only 6 with Spitfires. And 11 Group was given priority in quantity and quality of equipment; these ratios were far lower in the other Groups. The final piece of good news was the RDF network had operated effectively and accurately in its first real test against large raids.

On the other side of the Channel, the Stuka losses were a cause for concern. The accuracy they achieved by dive-bombing naval targets was a lesson not lost on their Japanese allies-to-be (confirming the correctness of their own strategies of Naval airpower), but in terms of Germany's current war against Britain, the loss of a few colliers and a score of fighters, most of which were regarded as an inferior type by the Luftwaffe, was not a balance against their own losses either. The heavy Stuka losses this day, added to those to be inflicted in the days to come, would ultimately lead to the type's withdrawal (pending their employment in the anticipated invasion), but even this day's "victory" by the RAF did not alter the course of the Battle. While it was a fine close-support aircraft, and would have had a major part to play if "Sealion" had been launched, the Stuka was not suited to the strategic bombing role now being thrust upon the Luftwaffe, and its withdrawal was almost inevitable for this reason. Low-flying Dornier sneak-raiders proved to be just as effective against airfields without the same vulnerability, and the major offensive burden of the Battle would have been placed on the medium bombers from early September in any case, once London became the prime target.

To compound the Luftwaffe's problems, although they were unaware they were doing so, they both over-estimated their own air-to-air successes, and under-estimated the overall size of Fighter Command, both by a factor of two. Before the 8th, they had developed an impression that the RAF was short of planes due to the small numbers of fighters committed previously, and thought the combats on this day represented a "maximum effort" by the RAF. They also thought that the RAF had lost such a large portion of their force on the day - about ten percent! - that they would no longer have enough planes to defend the Channel, and that it would only take a few days more - four at most - of clear weather to destroy the remainder of Fighter Command. The order to launch this major assault - Adlerangriff, the Attack of the Eagles, as soon as weather permitted - was issued as a result of the events on the 8th. In fact, Fighter Command had around a thousand Hurricanes and Spitfires available at units and in storage, and more coming off the assembly lines every day, and at no stage during the Battle was availability of planes a factor.

What Fighter Command really lacked throughout the Battle was pilots. The need to fly convoy protection sorties since early July had resulted in losses of experienced Squadron and Flight Leaders who were not easily replaced, as well as losses of other pilots who were fully-trained. This was as much to do with the lack of any sizable and cohesive Air-Sea Rescue service as anything, as most pilots shot down over the Channel (which was still freezing cold even in mid-summer) were lost even if they successfully baled out or ditched - although the large underslung radiators of both Hurricane and Spitfire made the latter a rare event, as the radiator hit the surface first, usually tipping the plane nose-over and straight underwater. The loss of 127 fighters between 10 July and 8 August was still some cause for concern though, given that losses in France were still being made good during this period, and the squadrons that had been committed to France had left Fighter Command well under its allotted establishment anyway. The flying of sorties day after day - many of which were fruitless patrols over the convoys - also increased wear on man and machine, either of which could prove fatal at a later date. Training and operational conversion courses were abbreviated in order to make squadrons back up to their normal strength from their losses in this period (although this still left every squadron undermanned), and many of these poorly-prepared pilots became victims far too quickly as a result, some on their first operational flight.

Adding to the Luftwaffe's sense of victory this day was the fact no more convoys sailed after 8 August. But this was not due to their efforts. The Admiralty "discovered" the vital coal being transported by sea could be moved by rail, and suddenly there was no longer any need to waste the lives of so many brave collier crews or fighter pilots on "prestige". Fighter Command was finally freed to do what it was meant to do - defend Britain.

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